This report outlines the observations of an NZSEE team of practitioners and researchers who travelled to the Kumamoto Prefecture of Japan on a reconnaissance visit following the April 2016 earthquakes. The observations presented in this report are focussed on the performance of reinforced concrete (RC) buildings throughout Kumamoto Prefecture. It was found overall that modern RC buildings performed well, with patterns of damage which highlighted a philosophy of designing stiffer buildings with less of an emphasis on ductile behaviour. To explore this important difference in design practice, the Japanese Building Standard Law (BSL) is summarised and compared with standard New Zealand seismic design practices and evaluation methods.
INTRODUCTION
Between 14 April and 16 April, 2016, a series of earthquakes struck Kumamoto Prefecture on Kyushu Island, Japan ( Figure  1 ). An NZSEE reconnaissance team made up of structural engineering researchers and practitioners (the authors), in collaboration with a Japanese team funded by Japan Science and Technology Agency, visited the Kumamoto Prefecture between 29 June and 3 July 2016. This report is organized to provide insights on the seismic demands from the earthquake and observed building performance, followed by a summary of seismic design actions, assessment procedures for existing buildings, and post-earthquake damage assessment procedures used in Japan. Detailed reports on building performance are provided in Appendices A1-A16 and referenced throughout the body of the paper.
KUMAMOTO EARTHQUAKE SEQUENCE
The largest foreshock of the Kumamoto sequence occurred at 21:26 JST on 14 April, with a magnitude of M j 6.5, in the Northern regions of the Hinagu Fault. This event was followed by further seismic activity, including the magnitude M j 7.3 main-shock at 01:25 JST on 16 April due to right lateral strike-slip movement of the Futagawa Fault. The main-shock was approximately 15 km South-East of Kumamoto City at a depth of 12 km [1] . Magnitudes are quoted in M j , which is the local magnitude scale calculated by the Japanese Meteorological Agency (JMA). In Mashiki near the Hinagu and Futagawa faults, both major events resulted in the maximum possible intensity of 7 on the Japan Meteorological Agency Intensity (JMAI) scale. Similar to the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence, the majority of the significant damage occurred in the second strong seismic event; but unlike Christchurch these events occurred so close together there was insufficient time to fully assess damage from the 14 April event before the 16 April event occurred just 28 hours later. The 2016 April Kumamoto earthquakes resulted in 50 fatalities and almost 3000 injuries, with most deaths occurring due to collapse of residential houses concentrated in Mashiki Town to the east of Kumamoto [3] . Death toll and injuries would likely have been considerably higher if the 14 April event had not occurred since many people had already evacuated their houses at the time of the 16 April main-shock. Multistory reinforced concrete buildings generally performed very well, most enabling immediate occupancy after the earthquakes. Damaged multistory buildings were generally constructed prior to 1981, when the Japanese Building code was updated following the 1978 Miyagi Earthquake. Figure 2 provides a comparison of response spectra for the 14 and 16 April 2016 Kumamoto and 22 February 2011 Christchurch events. Above 0.7 sec, the three events resulted in very similar levels of shaking, but at short periods the maximum response for the Kumamoto event was approximately twice as large as the maximum response from the Christchurch earthquake. A comparison of the Christchurch and Kumamoto design spectra for soft ground is also shown in Figure 2 . Kumamoto is a coastal region with a variety of ground conditions ranging from 'Hard' (defined as type 1 in Japanese building code) to 'Soft' (defined as type 3). The peak of the response spectrum for all three ground conditions is 0.9g. The spectrum for soft ground has been presented here to be consistent with the site class D spectrum shown for Christchurch. Japan Seismic Hazard Information Station (J-SHIS) publishes JMAI values for different return periods throughout Japan. Table 1 provides a comparison of JMAI values recorded in the 16 April event and probabilistic JMAI values for 475, 1000, and 2500 year return periods published on the J-SHIS website [4] . The comparison indicates that several stations close to the fault recorded ground motions at or above 2500 year motions. Kumamoto City experienced ground shaking representative of 500 to 1000 year motions.
MODERN BUILDING PERFORMANCE
Reinforced concrete construction has been widely used throughout Kumamoto City in government and school facilities as well as public and private apartment buildings. The most common structural system observed in residential reinforced concrete structures was moment frames with open first story, desirable by Japanese developers for maximizing the area usable for parking. Other common structural systems in residential buildings included combinations of moment frames in the long direction and shear walls in the transverse direction. Government and school facilities were commonly moment frames combined with shear walls. Base isolation was used in 24 buildings in the Kumamoto prefecture.
Based on observations of structures throughout the Kumamoto Prefecture it was evident that multi-story buildings were generally much stiffer and stronger than their New Zealand counterparts, with very few examples of modern buildings exhibiting damage consistent with high, or even moderate, ductility demands during the earthquake. Examples of such buildings are shown in Figure 3 . Buildings with open first stories for parking were very common, most with negligible damage despite the appearance of a soft story. Examples of good performing buildings are detailed in Appendix A -Building Damage Reports A2, A5 & A6. These anecdotal observations are supported by the limited red and yellow placards applied to modern buildings in Kumamoto Prefecture. A summary of the buildings assessed in the Mashiki Town area showed that, of the assessed RC structures, 71% were constructed post 1981 of which 89% were assessed as undamaged with the remaining 11% being deemed as only moderately damaged. A common observation in modern multistory RC residential buildings was shear failure in "non-structural walls" (See appendix A2 and A8). These non-structural wall components were made of reinforced concrete and were commonly tied into the structural system with what Japanese designers referred to as "half connections". This connection is shown in Figure 4 , where only half of the thickness of the wall has reinforcement extending into the lateral force resisting system. These walls are referred to as "non-structural" as they are not considered to contribute to the lateral strength of the building during design, but are accounted for when determining the stiffness of the structure. This practice is a contributing factor to the lower ductility behavior of the observed RC structures.
Figure 2: (a) Kumamoto vs. Christchurch response spectra. (b) Kumamoto vs. Christchurch design spectra (based on Z=0.22 -pre 2011 hazard factor). Response of April 16 Kumamoto and Feb. 22 Christchurch event included. Japanese design Level 1 represents the 'Damage Limit State' (similar to NZ SLS) and Level 2 represents the 'Safety Limit State' (similar to NZ ULS). Kumamoto response spectra obtained from data recorded at K-net station KMM006. Christchurch response spectra represent average response of data from CanNet stations CCCC and CHHC as well as NSMN stations CBGS and REHS

Figure 4: Typical non-structural wall connection and example of damage to non-structural wall (see Appendix A2).
Performance of Base Isolated Buildings
Three base isolated multistory RC residential buildings were inspected in close proximity to Kumamoto city centre. All three structures had some level of visible damage or residual displacement, but all had been cleared for occupation and had generally performed well. Details of the inspection of these buildings can be found in appendix A5 and A6. Figure 5 provides some examples of the external damage observed.
Figure 5: External damage to base isolated buildings (a) Base Isolated Building No.1 (Appendix A5) (b) & (c) Base Isolated Building No.2 (Appendix A6).
The reconnaissance team was given access to the basement of Base Isolated Building No. 1 (Appendix A5) to inspect the state of the isolation system of the structure. Observations of the damage ( Figure 6 ) indicate that the building performed well, however due to some unconventional design choices, the damping system of the structure sustained heavy damage. The structure was damped using a combination of steel and lead dampers (refer to Appendix A5 for plan of isolation system and location of isolators). All base isolators were connected through a grid of concrete beams and no damage was observed to the isolators. The steel dampers were also connected into the concrete beam grid, however as shown in Figure 6 , they were connected with an eccentricity which contributing to the damage sustained by the supporting concrete blocks. The lead dampers were completely excluded from the concrete beam grid and were simply connected to the concrete slab above by protruding concrete blocks. Most of the protruding concrete blocks for the lead dampers displayed similar damage to that shown in Figure 6 (c), where the concrete block-slab connection was completely lost. [4] .
Access was not obtained to the isolation basement of Base Isolated Building No.2 and No.3, however, the damage observed externally was minimal with the exception of shear failure of a stairwell wall which was concentrated between the first floor plane of isolation of the main structure and the base isolation of the stairwell at the ground level ( Figure 5b ). All base isolated buildings continued to be occupied after the earthquakes.
Figure 6: Damage sustained to Steel (a) & (b) and lead (c) dampers below Base Isolated Building No. 1.
Nonstructural Element Performance
Authors observed limited damage to nonstructural elements, in part due to clean up in the more than two months since the earthquakes but also due to design features used to minimize damage. There were many examples of mechanical plants being housed externally which avoided damage through the use of flexible connections and appropriate fixings. In cases of public school facilities, a lack of suspended ceilings and sprinkler systems was noted with the result being very limited amounts of damage due to non-structural system failure. Damage to suspended ceilings in gymnasium facilities was observed, and in one notable case resulted in emergency evacuation facilities not being suitable for use following the earthquake. It was noted by Japanese researchers, that several facilities in Japan have opted to remove suspended ceilings since the extensive damage to such systems in the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake. Further details of non-structural element performance can be found in appendix A16.
PRE-1981 CONCRETE BUILDING PERFORMANCE
Earthquake design in the Building Standard Law of Japan (BSL; equivalent to the New Zealand Building Statutesincluding NZS1170) was significantly revised in 1981 following damage in the 1978 Miyagi Earthquake. As such, many pre-1981 buildings do not comply with the current seismic standard and have performed poorly in past earthquakes. Figure 7 provides three examples of pre-1980s concrete buildings with severe damage to columns and beamcolumn joints. Appendices A3, A11, and A15 provide further details on these buildings. Damage observed in such buildings tended to be concentrated in the first story which typically was open for parking while non-structural walls provided additional stiffness on upper stories. From 52 RC buildings assessed by Japanese authorities in the Mashiki Town area, 15 were constructed prior to 1981 with 5 being deemed undamaged, 8 moderately damaged and 2 had collapsed.
JAPANESE SEISMIC DESIGN APPROACH
To understand the observed good performance of modern buildings in this strong earthquake, it is necessary to appreciate the seismic design approach used in Japan. The following section describes how seismic design forces are determined, an overview of the verification steps, and provides a comparison with NZS 1170.5 design forces.
Scientific study of earthquakes in Japan dates back to the 1880s, with building standards and guidelines only coming into effect in 1920. Seismic resistant building guidelines or detailing were not included however, and design standards and procedures were gradually developed through many significant seismic events over the decades. The first inclusion of seismic detailing in building guidelines came in 1924 following significant damage and loss of life in the Tokyo and Yokohama regions in the 1923 Kanto Earthquake. The Japan BSL was only introduced in 1950, applying to all forms of building construction. At the time, BSL did not include technical guidelines but instead referred to the previous building guidelines for such requirements. Since the introduction of BSL, many revisions and additions have been made, largely based on observed performance and damaged of buildings in major seismic events. Notable changes to BSL include major revisions in 1971 and 1981 following the 1968 Tokachi-oki and 1978 Miyagi-ken Oki Earthquakes, respectively. These revisions included changes to detailing as well as a focus on the use of larger sections and improved shear capacity of members. The procedures for the current seismic design provisions of BSL are largely unchanged after the 1981 revision. Building damage in seismic events following the 1981 revision has highlighted the improved performance of post-1981 buildings relative to the performance of pre-1971 and pre-1981 construction [5] .
The seismic design forces for building design in Japan are specified in Japan BSL [6] . Two design levels are considered; Level 1 "damage limit verification" where functionality of the building must be maintained and Level 2 "safety limit verification" where life safety must be satisfied. There are no importance factors used in the determination of seismic loads in BSL, however guidelines from the Ministry of Land Infrastructure Transport and Tourism (MLIT) provide a threelevel importance rating in relation to public buildings and facilities which applies an importance factor to design actions. Buildings are categorised as Normal (Importance factor = 1), School or Government Facilities (Importance factor = 1.25) and finally Hospitals and Emergency Facilities (Importance factor = 1.5). BSL design shear force at each storey is calculated by multiplying the full live load and dead load for the storey by a b c seismic storey shear coefficient, C i :
where, C o is the standard shear coefficient (0.2 for Level 1 damage limit verification and 1.0 for Level 2 safety limit verification, except timber buildings use 0.3 and 1.0, respectively) Z is the earthquake region coefficient (see Figure 8 ).
R t is a value depending on the elastic period of the building and the ground conditions (see Figure 9 )
A i is a value representing the distribution of seismic shear coefficient over the height of the building (see Figure 10 ) given as
where T is the natural period of the building and  i is the ratio of the cumulative weight from the roof to the i th storey (i.e. W i + W i+1 +…W n ) to the total building weight (i.e. W 1 + W 2 +…W n ). 
Figure 9: R t values for buildings of different natural period founded on different soil types. Figure adapted from BSL seismic loading guidelines [6].
Note that the seismic hazard used to arrive at the design forces in the BSL is not derived from Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA) for PGA or spectral ordinates as is commonly done in most other countries including New Zealand. Instead Japan is divided into three regions (plus Okinawa) based on historical seismicity (see Figure 8 ), with each region assigned an earthquake region coefficient (Z) from 1.0 to 0.8 (0.7 for Okinawa only). Much of the populated east coast of the main island of Japan, Honshu, is in Zone A with Z=1.0. The majority of Kumamoto Prefecture is assigned Z=0.9 with some western regions such as Uto City assigned Z=0.8. The earthquake region coefficients have not changed in the BSL since 1979. The earthquake region coefficients, and hence the seismic design forces, vary by less than 25% across most of Japan. In New Zealand, the hazard factor (Z) varies between 0.13 for Auckland and Northland to 0.4 in Wellington and 0.6 close to the Alpine Fault at Otira and Arthurs Pass.
Figure 10: Sensitivity of A i to different values of α i. Figure adapted from BSL seismic loading guidelines [6].
It has been suggested that for Zone A (Z=1.0), the damage limit verification level is intended to represent the demand corresponding to frequent earthquakes with PGA of about 0.08-0.1g; while the safety limit verification level represents the demand corresponding to rare earthquakes with PGA 0.3-0.4g [7] .
For Level 1 damage verification, drift in each storey at design shear is normally limited to a maximum of 1/200 (0.5%); but may be increased up to 1/120 (0.8%) if there is evidence of sustaining no substantial damage at this drift limit. Note the drift is an elastic drift obtained by elastic analysis without any consideration for ductility.
For buildings shorter than 31 m, the building may be deemed acceptable by checking the stiffness distribution up the building and the torsional susceptibility and ensuring that allowable stresses are not exceeded (see Table 2 (a) & (b) for allowable stress limits for RC structures).
The final step for buildings under 31 m height is to ensure sufficient strength through a simplified check of the area of columns and walls in each story. Based on the primary lateral load resisting system of the structure being frame or wall based, Equation 3 (wall) or 4 (frame) is used for the minimum wall/column area check on each floor. Note pure frame structures are then also designed to level 2 of the BSL. For Level 2 safety verification, only required when a building is over 31m or does not meet the stiffness or eccentricity ratio limits above, the design storey shear force is calculated as:
Where Q un is the required value of ultimate lateral strength of each storey Q ud is the elastic shear force acting in each storey due to the design seismic action (i.e. product of C i and cumulative storey weight including full live and dead loads) F es is a factor to account for the stiffness irregularity of the building in height and plan. It is calculated for each story of a building by multiplying stiffness ratio factor F s (defined in Table 3 ) and the eccentricity ratio factor F e (defined in Table  4 ). The stiffness ratio, R s , for each story must satisfy the following:
where rs is the reciprocal of the relative story drift angle for each story and rs is the arithmetic mean of all the rs values for the building.
The eccentricity ratio, R e , of each story must satisfy the following:
Where e is distance between the centre of mass and stiffness and re is the "elasticity radius" based on the ratio of the torsional to lateral stiffness at each story. D s is a value representing structural characteristics (damping and ductility) of the lateral load resisting components in each storey (see Figure 11 ). D s is effectively equal to the inverse of the assumed design ductility. Figure 11 implies that the assumed design ductility for concrete frames in the Japan BSL ranges between 1.8 and 3.3; in contrast to New Zealand where the design ductility ranges from 1.25 to 6. This means that in Japanese design practice, elastic demand of regular buildings is reduced by a factor 1.8 to 3.3 depending on their ability to deform plastically, whereas in NZ the S p and K  (ductility) factors can reduce the elastic demand by a factor of six or more.
Figure 11: Example of D s values for concrete frames. Figure adapted from BSL seismic loading guidelines [6].
Stiffness Ratio, Rs Stiffness Ratio Factor, Fs 2.0-(Rs/0.6)
1.0
Where Rs represents the stiffness ratio for each story.
Rs ≥ 0.6 Rs < 0.6
Where Re represents the eccentricity ratio for each story. 
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Low High Figure 12 outlines a simple comparison of the resultant sections from applying both New Zealand ULS design and Japanese allowable stress design to a cantilevered reinforced concrete column. It can be seen that the Japanese allowable stress design requirements do indeed result in larger and stiffer sections. This preliminary analysis shows that the Japanese stress limit design requires a section between 35 to 50% larger than that required to satisfy NZ ULS design requirements.
2: Allowable stress limits for Level 1 'Damage Limit' design for (a) concrete (b) steel reinforcement: Adapted from BSL Article 91. Load cases for stress checks are defined in BSL Article 82 (2) [5]. These combinations include Dead, Live, Wind, Snow and Seismic loading with consideration given to regions with heavy snow fall.
Figure 12: Comprison of sections derived by New Zealand ULS vs Japanese BSL Allowable stress design for a cantilevered reinforced concrete column.
Comparison between Japanese and New Zealand Seismic Design Actions
A summary of the key differences between the seismic design actions from the Japanese BSL and NZS 1170.5 have also been provided in Table 5 . Since some differences can be counteracting, it is useful to compare the story shear forces for an example 10-story building located in different cities in New Zealand and Japan as shown in Figures 13 to 15 . This comparison makes it clear that the design actions in Kumamoto are greater than most locations in New Zealand, particularly for the safety (Level 2) check, and exceed ULS design forces in Christchurch by approximately a factor of 2 (depending on soil type assumed).
Note: If ductility of 1 is used, the three NZ plots will increase by 25%. For Tokyo, the demand will be about 11% higher than Kumamoto. If Soil Type D (arguably within the range covered by Japan soil type 3) is used for NZ, the NZ demand will reduce by 35%.
Figure 13: Story Shear Force for Kumamoto (Damage Check, Soil Type 3) vs NZS1170 SLS (Ductility 1.25, Soil
Type E). Strength check using ductility factors ranging from 6 to 1.25 (additional reduction by Sp=0.7).
Strength check using ductility factors ranging from 3.3 to 1.8.
Based on historical seismicity leading to identification of three zones.
No specific return period considered.
Three soil types with no application at short periods and approx. max amplification of 2.0 at long periods.
Dead plus full live load (Note, live load specified in Japanese code for calculation of seismic mass is significantly lower.
Serviceability (Level 1 Damage limit)
Drift limits: 1/200 (0.5%); but may be increased up to 1/120 (0.8%). Table 2 for limits.
Allowable stress checks -See
No ULS design unless stiffness and torsion requirements are not satisfied. Lateral capacity check required based on total cross sectional area of walls and columns as well as shear design.
None specified.
Irregularity Checks
Irregularity checks limit types of analysis and ductility of structures.
ULS (Safety Limit)
Drift limit = 2.5% (Elastic drifts are amplified by kdm = 1.2 to 1.5 and by design ductility).
Hard limits on: -Vertical stiffness distribution -torsional susceptibility (If not satisfied must do ULS check for H>31m). 
BSL Allowable Stress Section 500 MPa
Note: Ds=0.3 is assigned for the most ductile category allowed in Japanese code. For Tokyo, the demand will be about 11% higher than Kumamoto. If Soil Type D (arguably within the range covered by Japan soil type 3) is used for NZ, the NZ demand will reduce by 35%.
Note: Ds=0.3 is assigned for the most ductile category in BSL. For important buildings, the NZ demand will increase by 30% for IL3 and 80% for IL4 (might be larger for IL4 as SLS2 criteria kicks in and ductility of 4 might not be tenable). No change for Japan. Even with 80% increase for an emergency building in Wellington, the building designed in Tokyo will still be designed for a base shear demand that is almost twice as that for IL4 building in Wellington.
Noting that the drift limits are applied for Level 1 in BSL and for ULS in NZS 1170.5, it is of interest to compare the ratio of the drift limits and the elastic design forces as shown in Table  6 for the example 10 story building considered in Figures 13 to 15. The ratios shown in Table 6 suggest that the drift limit check at ULS for NZS1170.5 is approximately equivalent to the drift limit check at Level 1 in the Japan BSL and thus this design parameter cannot be attributed to the overall stiffer structures which were observed in Japan. Some further comparisons of design actions derived from BSL and NZS 1170.5 are shown in Table 7 . It can be seen that seismic actions for design scenarios in Kumamoto, comparable to conditions in Christchurch, yield reduced base shears of up to 3.6 times larger than those from NZS 1170.5. 
JAPANESE SEISMIC EVALUATION OF EXISTING REINFORCED CONCRETE BUILDINGS
Seismic evaluation of pre-1981 concrete buildings is done in Japan according to the Japanese Building Disaster Prevention Association (JBDPA) Standard for Seismic Evaluation of Existing Reinforced Concrete Buildings [8] . Similar to many other assessment guidelines and standards internationally (e.g. ASCE 41 [9] , Eurocode 8 Part 3 [10] , and draft NZ guideline Seismic Assessment of Existing Buildings [11] ), JBDPA provides a means of assessing and retrofitting buildings designed prior to the development of current seismic design codes. The standard calculates a seismic capacity index, based on the product of the strength and ductility for each story of the structure and compares this coefficient to a seismic demand index, :
The seismic capacity index, is the minimum value of (Equation 9) determined on a floor-by-floor basis in each principal direction of the building. It is dependent on the strength and ductility of structural members with modifiers for age and shape of the building.
Where, = signifies the floor number, = irregularity index related to the shape of the building, T = aging index and 0 = seismic capacity index.
The seismic capacity index, 0 is dependent on the ductility and strength of the structural elements on each floor, and hence, a representation of the energy dissipation capacity of these elements. 0 is calculated based on Equation 10 : 
Figure 14: Story Shear Force for Kumamoto (Safety Check, Soil Type 3, D s =0.3) vs NZS1170 ULS (IL2, Ductility 4, Soil Type E).
Figure 15: Story Shear Force for Tokyo (Safety Check, Soil Type 2, D s =0.3) vs NZS1170 ULS (IL2, Ductility 4, Soil Type C).
where, C = Strength index at i th floor, F = Ductility index at i th floor and ϕ = Story shear distribution index estimated simply as +1 + , where n is the number of stories in the building.
The seismic demand index, is determined as per Equation 11:
where, = Basic Seismic Demand index equal to 0.8 for level 1 screening, 0.6 for level 2 and 3 screening, Z = Zone index from Figure 8 , G = Ground index, accounting for amplification effects of the surface soil and U = Importance Factor as described in the previous section on the Japanese BSL.
As previously alluded to, the JBDPA evaluation guide provides three different procedures for the calculation of the strength (C) and ductility (F) indices. The three levels increase in complexity and accuracy, such that an engineer will typically start with Level 1 and only proceed to Level 2 or 3 if requirements are not satisfied. These procedures are briefly described below but further details of all three levels can be found in Section 3 of the JBDPA Standard for Seismic Evaluation of Existing Reinforced Concrete Buildings.
Level One
Simplest method which may be considered analogous to a screening method or the Initial Evaluation Procedure (IEP) in New Zealand.
Strength Index, C: Calculated based on the cross-sectional area of walls and columns on each floor.
Ductility Index, F: For this level the vertical elements are categorized into two groups, walls and columns (F = 1.0), and short columns (F = 0.8).
Level Two
This method assumes a story mechanism as this is the most common mechanism observed in damaged buildings in Japan.
Strength Index, C: C is calculated from the ultimate lateral load carrying capacity of vertical members (columns and walls) with the assumption that beams are "strong enough" to force a strong-beam-weak-column mechanism. The strength index calculation in this level, considers the failure mode of the vertical load carrying elements i.e. shear/flexure controlled columns and walls, as well as brittle columns. The index is calculated based on the minimum of the ultimate shear strength, Q su and the shear force Q mu at the development of a flexural mechanism. Where Q su is the lower of the two, the member is classified as shear-controlled and where Q mu is the lower the member is classified as flexure-controlled.
Ductility Index, F: The Guideline provides a set of equations for the determination of the ductility index at each floor based on the classification of the vertical elements as shear or flexure controlled from the calculation of the C index.
Level Three
This is similar to the procedure in Level Two except that the collapse mechanism of the building is determined from analysis rather than assuming a story mechanism.
Strength Index, C: The effect of earthquake induced axial loads are now taken into consideration in the calculation of the ultimate load carrying capacities. A detailed analysis is used to determine the location of hinges in the structure based on a comparison of beam and column yield moments at joints. Ductility Index, F: A set of detailed equations are provided for the determination of the ductility index, in accordance with the vertical member classification provided in the Level Three procedure. The classification system includes categories for flexure-controlled and shear-controlled beams and walls with uplift.
Since , T, ϕ, Z, G, U are frequently equal to 1.0, the methodology effectively simplifies down to:
Note that a structure with an index above 0.6 is generally expected to exhibit good performance based on historical evidence of past damaging earthquakes (see Figure 16 ). This empirical limit has been supported again by the observed damage to buildings in the Kumamoto earthquake (where available, Is values are provided in Appendices for buildings inspected).
While the Is limit can be achieved through increased strength (C) or ductility (F), emphasis has recently been placed on increases in strength (C) if post-earthquake functionality is a desired performance objective in the retrofit design. Increasing ductility is only seen as a viable option if focus of retrofit is solely for life safety.
Figure 16: Statistics of Is index values of public RC structures in comparison to damaged RC structures in
Shizuoka, Japan -Figure adapted from Nakano & Teshigawara [12] .
JAPANESE POST-EARTHQUAKE DAMAGE EVALUATION PROCEDURE
Following major damaging earthquakes in Japan, a rapid inspection process is undertaken where, similar to New Zealand, buildings are classified into one of three categories and Red, Yellow, or Green placards are placed on the outside of buildings, clearly identifying the level of damage.
It should be noted that in contrast to New Zealand, placards in Japan are only advisory, hence owners and tenants could choose to enter and occupy yellow and red placard buildings. Occupancy of damaged buildings was observed by the reconnaissance team.
Building placards can be removed or changed following the rapid assessment, if the identified issues or risks are addressed. Private building owners carry the responsibility for ensuring that repairs or reconstruction takes place, while public buildings will be systematically addressed by regional government. A varying level of funding is also made available by the national government for both private and public buildings for repairs and reconstruction, depending on yearly budgets and damage sustained following the earthquake. Figure 17 shows the building assessment process following an earthquake. Following the rapid assessment procedure, a more detailed damage assessment is then carried out. In Japan, the residual seismic capacity of buildings is currently defined by the R-index in accordance with the Japanese Damage Evaluation Guideline (JDEG). The guideline, established in 1991, was originally based on the evaluation of buildings with a story-collapse failure mechanism, being the most common failure mechanism in Japanese RC buildings. A revision of the guideline was released in 2015, with the inclusion of an Rindex evaluation method for buildings where a full frame mechanism develops with yielding of beams throughout the structure.
The general calculation for the residual seismic capacity ratio, R-index, is shown in Equation 13:
Where, = original seismic capacity index discussed previously and = post-earthquake seismic capacity discussed below.
Similar to the index, the index (Equation 14) is also determined based on the strength (C) and ductility (F) indices. A seismic capacity reduction factor, ɳ is also applied to these indices when calculating . The reduction factor take into consideration the deterioration in the energy dissipation capacity of each structural element, represented by the product of the strength and ductility indices.
is determined on a floor by floor basis in each principal direction. = Σ( . . ). .
The reduction factor ɳ, are determined for all structural elements on a floor to calculate the index. In practice these reduction factors are determined through inspection of the structural elements and classification of their damage state as described by the JDEG guidelines. For RC Buildings, JDEG defines five levels of damage for both ductile and brittle elements which are used to classify individual structural elements ( III Some heavy cracks of 1 -2mm wide are found. Some concrete spalling is observed.
IV
Many heavy cracks are found. Crack widths larger than 2mm. Reinforcing bars exposed due to spalling of cover concrete.
V Buckling of reinforcement, crushing of concrete core, vertical deformation of columns and/or shear walls. Subsidence of upper floor and/or fracture of reinforcing bars are observed in some cases. 
III
Some heavy cracks of 1 -2mm wide are found. Some concrete spalling is observed. Diagonal X crack patterns may be visible.
IV
Many heavy cracks are found. Crack widths larger than 2mm. Reinforcing bars exposed due to spalling of cover concrete. A significant reduction in both lateral and vertical load carrying capacity of vertical elements. Each class is defined with observable characteristics of the sustained damage with key factors used to differentiate ductile and brittle elements such as distinct crack patterns. In the latest edition of JDEG, elements are further classified into ductile, quasi-ductile and brittle columns, shear walls and beams. As described by Maeda et al. [13] , the η factors in the guideline were determined based on experimental data where η is calculated based on the residual energy dissipation capacity of a structural element as shown in Figure 18 . The resultant R-index which is obtained from application of JDEG can be used to classify the building into the following categories shown in Table 10 . 
Figure 19: R-index evaluation results vs Engineer's expert judgment for RC school buildings damaged in 1995 Kobe
Earthquake and 2011 East Japan Earthquake. Figure  adapted from Maeda et al. [13] .
The 95% threshold has been set to correspond with the serviceability level performance of buildings and hence buildings with 95% or above R-index do not require any rehabilitation. JDEG provides guidance based on the intensity of the earthquake, R-index of the superstructure and foundation, the cases which required rehabilitation or in severe cases detailed analysis for further options and finally demolition. Maeda et al. (2014) outlines the results of the application of JDEG to 70 RC school buildings following the 2011 East Japan Earthquake and 140 RC school buildings following the 1995 Kobe Earthquake. The results of this analysis have been plotted against the judgment of experts based on their observations of these buildings. This plot is shown in Figure 19 and the close correlation between the Rindex boundaries shown in Table 10 and expert's judgment is evident.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The April 2016 Kumamoto earthquakes share similarities with the 2010-11 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence; both comprised of multiple damaging events, including a shallow event in close proximity to a major urban center and similar levels of shaking for structures with periods above 0.7s. These similarities provide a unique opportunity for comparison of building performance in the two countries and possible lessons for structural design.
The observations from Kumamoto particularly highlighted a difference in the resilience of New Zealand and Japanese buildings and the subsequent impact on the city as a whole. The overarching impression in Kumamoto was of a functioning city with the majority of the population being able to carry on with their daily lives with minimal disruption, and no sight of closed off areas or "Red Zones" two months after the earthquake. In contrast, an exclusion zone was maintained in Christchurch CBD for over 2 years following the February 2011 earthquake.
Modern code designed structures in Kumamoto sustained limited damage and exhibited good performance on the whole. The inspected buildings pointed to a design philosophy emphasising stiffer and stronger buildings than those commonly seen in New Zealand and few examples of high ductility demands were noted. Observations of stiffer and stronger structures have been supported by the analysis of the Japanese BSL seismic design guidelines. As outlined in this report, Japanese structures are designed to higher base shears and assume ductility of 1.8 to 3.3, compared to design ductility of 1.25 to 6.0 in New Zealand. The Japanese BSL adopts a simple allowable stress design approach for the Level 1 design, typically resulting in larger and stiffer sections than New Zealand ULS design. On the other hand, the BSL does not focus on the identification of ductile mechanisms and capacity design to the same extent as New Zealand Standards.
It is also worth noting that the seismic design forces in the BSL have not changed since 1981, while NZS design forces change frequently as the science for determining probabilistic seismic hazard evolves. While many codes in the world have "scientifically progressed" from seismic zones to probabilistic assessment of hazard, the Japanese BSL has remained far more stable by avoiding the delusional precision of estimating future earthquake demands and the reliance on a constantly changing science in setting building design forces.
Non-structural elements were also observed to have performed favorably in the Kumamoto earthquake. Proactive practices such as passive fire resistance and removal of suspended ceiling panels were also observed in order to minimise internal damage due to nonstructural systems and allow offices and schools to return to a functioning state as rapidly as possible.
The implementation of post-earthquake rapid assessment was also observed in Kumamoto, using a tagging procedure similar to the system used in New Zealand. Unlike the New Zealand system, however, the building tags are only advisory in nature, and although they are largely adhered to by the public they are not strictly enforced. There was also an emphasis in damaged areas to maintain community services in place with government and school facilities being kept on site through the use of temporary offices and classrooms.
Overall, the observations of the performance and community response in Kumamoto highlighted similar goals to New Zealand where life safety was concerned; however, in terms of resilience and return to function, the observations were quite contrasting to what was experienced in New Zealand following both the Christchurch and Kaikoura Earthquakes. This contrast suggests that the New Zealand structural engineering profession should carefully consider if the widely accepted design philosophy relying on high ductility response of modern structures could be replaced by a focus on strength and stiffness leading to lower ductility demands and faster recovery after earthquakes.
Research is required to identify the cost of such changes to building designs in New Zealand and potential architectural impacts due to the need for larger structural elements. Cost considerations must not only include higher up-front costs, but also savings in terms of life cycle costs due to lower damage in future earthquakes.
The authors encourage the continued exchange and comparison of design philosophies and field experiences between the earthquake engineering professions of Japan and New Zealand.
APPENDIX A BUILDING DAMAGE REPORTS
Building Damage Report -A1
Item Details
Street Address/Location Apartment C: Irichimachi, Uto City
Construction Year 1998
Building Description Private residential apartments. Structural form is regular in plan with pilotis ground floor.
Building Footprint / Floor Area 48x12m
No. of storeys / basements 4
Structural system
Regular RC moment-frames with flat-slab floor system. Transverse end walls, and walls around the stairs. Infill walls non-structural, insitu RC stairs.
Earthquake resisting system RC MRFs + end walls in transverse direction. Some contribution likely from the walls associated to the stairs although uncertain if intended.
Foundation system
Uncertain but possibly shallow footings due to spreading of wall bases away from the footprint.
Past seismic strengthening None
Likely Design Standards Latest Japanese Design Code (post 1981)
Plan showing floor slab outline and full-height structural elements and photo locations.
Photo 1: North-east part elevation.
Photo 2: South-west part elevation.
Photo 3: Column hinge and end wall footing spread Photo 4: Plastic hinge at top of column.
Photo 5: Column plastic hinge with intact concrete core.
Observations  The damage observed from the outside of this building was limited to the ground floor only. All of the columns had formed plastic hinges at the top of the columns and very limited damage was observed at the column bases.
Possibly there is column damage below ground level.
 The column plastic hinges may be due to capacity design not being followed through completely with the interaction of the first floor transfer slab. There appeared to be bars terminated within the top of the ground floor columns, however it is uncertain if these are column bars or 90 degree bends from slab and beam steel. Generally the hinge was well confined, with the concrete core remaining intact, although vertical bar buckling was observed in many locations.  The end transverse walls had formed horizontal cracks as a result of the wall folding against the Level 1 transfer slab. There was also noticeable spread of the wall base away from the building, indicating that the footings were not tied into the rest of the building foundation system.  The walls around the stairs had limited damage. Given the short MRF bays in the longitudinal direction is likely that these were not intended to act as seismic resistance. Details of the slab connections could not be observed to understand if the stair areas were effectively isolated from the main building.
Building Damage Report -A2
Item Details
Street Address/Location 
Plan showing floor slab outline with known full-height structural elements and photo locations. Photo 1: North-west elevation.
Photo 2: East part elevation.
Photo 3: Typical infill concrete wall shear cracking due to interaction with moment frame beams. Photo 4: Moment frame beam flexural hinging in regions not affected by infill walls.
Photo 5: Foundation settlement at base of shear walls due to rocking.
Observations  Well distributed flexural cracks in some of the momentframe beams, but no cracking in the columns or joint regions. This would suggest that the strong-column weakbeam design intent for the moment-frames was achieved where the infill walls didn't interfere with the frame response.  Some damage observed to the pavement around the corewalls on the north-west side of the building and settlement relative to the surrounding pavement. This suggests that the walls (particularly those attached the perimeter of the building) have rocked with limited soil failure. The foundation system is unknown but if these cores were not considered part of the primary lateral-force resisting system then they may not have the same foundation treatment as the rest of the building.  Within each moment-frame bay, 'non-structural' reinforced concrete infill walls were used to define windows and doors, however these were constructed to be integral with the moment-frames. Extensive shear cracking was observed in these elements.  The observed damage in this building represented typical reinforced concrete design and construction practice that is understood to have been applied in Japanese seismic design for a number of years under previous design codes, and to some extent under the current code. The rigidly connected 'non-structural' panel approach has only recently has been phased out of standard practice. 
Building Damage Report -A3
Item Details
Street Address/Location
Photo 4: Uplift of wall (does not appear to be structural wall).
Photo 5a: crushed columns at corners of walls around core.
Photo 5b: crushed columns at corners of walls around core.
Photo 6: Damage to first floor diaphragm at wall (similar damage not apparent on other levels).
Photo 7
Observations  Complete collapse of first story except along street.  RC walls around elevator and stairs not structural (limited anchorage to foundation), but may have contributed to torsional response of building.  No apparent structural walls in building.  Most columns crushed and unable to identify mode of failure.  Photos 1-3 show column with shear failure at base and joint failureexpect shear failure occurred first followed by joint failure when column slides down shear failure plane and is forced outward.  Photo 6 shows damage to diaphragm near core (possible shear damage), but similar damage not observed at upper levels and thus believed to be damage induced by bending (or compression) of slab during collapse.  Two similar buildings located next door and across the street did not collapse (Refer building summary A4 for description of building across the street). Other Across street from building described in Appendix A3 (collapsed) 
Building Damage Report -A4
Item Details
Plan showing building layout with known full-height structural elements and photo locations (walls shown in blue -uncertain if core is structural) Elevation
Photo 4: Wall on west end of building.
Observations  Across street from collapsed building. (Appendix A3)  Built by same owner 5 years prior to collapsed building.  Both designed to pre-1981 code  Primary difference is presence of wall at west end of building and location of core in the corner of L-shape (could not confirm if core is structural)  Significant bidirectional shear cracking on two interior columnsbidirectional shear appears more prevalent in Japan due to similar size beams in two orthogonal directions.  Cracking on third column appears torsional (cracks wrap around column No. of storeys / basements 15 stories (+ 1 Storey Basement)
Structural system RC moment frame in orthogonal directions
Earthquake resisting system RC moment frame with base isolation at underside of ground floor slab level in basement Majority of damage to damping system.  Steel dampers were not positioned to fully align with the structural beams above but are significantly eccentric in relation to the main structure beams. The stub columns above the steel dampers show damage caused by structural separation of these columns from the main building structure (refer Photos 3 and 4).  Lead dampers were all located away from the main structure beams and the stub columns above these dampers were connected to the ground floor slab above only.
 All lead dampers showed failure at connection to the ground floor slab (refer Photos 5-7). Limited anchorage of longitudinal reinforcement observed.  Significant damage observed at the junction of ground floor slab in the area of the dampers stub columns.  Structure consists of 16 base isolated concrete columns supported on laminated elastomeric bearings, with four additional small bearings connected to the base slab (No columns above).  Some cracking was observed above small base isolation columns. This cracking was observed through the base slab in areas where there was access to inspect (refer Photos 9 and 10)
Building Damage Report -A6 
Item Details
Photo 4: Damage to the first level of stairs on base isolated Building No.2. Staircase isolated at ground level while isolation plane of main structure was at level 1.
Observations  Both buildings exhibited approximately 300mm of residual displacement. Their design allowed for up to 600mm  One building has a multilevel base isolation system with the main structure isolated a first floor while the stairs and elevator shaft extend to ground with an isolation (sliding) joint at ground floor.  This building showed significant cracking and damage to the concrete wall and associated elements to one of the staircases between ground floor and first floor. It appears the base of the stair did not slide as the design had intended.  The other building is isolated completely at ground floor on single concrete raft. No visible damage was observed.
Building Damage Report -A7
Item Details
Street Address/Location Kumamoto Prefecture
Building Description Private University Gymnasium
No. of storeys / basements 1 with mezzanine at end and sides of building No. of storeys / basements 3 storey , no basement
Structural system
Concrete moment frame with infill concrete "non-structural" walls. Cast in place concrete floors constructed with shallow arch configuration.
Earthquake resisting system
Longitudinal: Concrete moment frame on exterior of building Transverse: Concrete moment frame and concrete infill "non-structural walls between classrooms No. of storeys / basements 12 storey with pilotis ground floor for parking
Structural system
Rectangular regular RC building supported on concrete frames and walls.
Earthquake resisting system
Transverse NS (1 long bay ~12m): 5 RC moment frames. The frame on west and east ends include wall sections of different lengths while the three interior frames have longer spans with relatively small beams suggesting these columns may respond like cantilever columns. Longitudinal EW (4 equal bays): 2 RC moment frames. The south frame is bare on the ground floor whereas the frame on the North side has infill RC walls in 3 bays
Foundation system Unknown
Other notable features
The column size was 950x950mm at the pilotis floor. We understand the column size reduces from the 2 nd floor onwards. May be due to the stringent design requirement to avoid soft story failure in the current Japanese code (design seismic coefficient of 0.55 for soft storey failure). Beams along the longitudinal direction are deeper and wider than the much longer beam along the transverse direction. Two intermediate beams run along the longitudinal direction on top of the ground floor, but no columns or walls were present along these beams.
Past seismic strengthening None
Likely The number of railings crossing the edge of adjacent (left side) undamaged apartment confirmed the slight eastward lean of the building on this side.)  The walls (we were told they were non-structural, but the Tokyo University researchers were saying these were designed as structural walls) on the North face and the east face were severely damaged.  North walls had failed in shear, it appeared that the walls were subjected to huge shear towards east.  The east walls had bidirectional shear cracks throughout the wall  A column on the north longitudinal frame had failed in shear. Although the bars appeared buckled at the damaged location, it was not the typical flexure-induced buckling of bars. The bars were subjected to shear deformation (dowel action) and axial compression which forced them to buckle.  There was sign of plastic hinges about to develop in some beams. Observations  This building suffered severe damage at the fourth floor, while relatively little damage was observed in the lower levels. The building has a very high plan eccentricity due to the services and stair core being located outside the main floor footprint, and attached at one corner of the floor plan.  It is likely that the beam-column joint shear failure occurred due to accentuated deformation demands under the torsional plan response. Perimeter beam offset from the column centre-line and possibly poorly anchored reinforcement, either in the beam-column joint or from.  An internal beam, may have allowed the perimeter beam on the south-west elevation to drop inwards from the column, resulting in the 1.5m floor settlement and outward lean of the upper floors to the south-west.  This building was listed as a high priority for seismic retrofit prior to the earthquakes . .
Sketch plan of building layout Photo 1: Aerial view of campus indicating location of building. Elevation A: View of west exterior elevation looking from one 4 storey block towards the other 4 storey block Elevation B: View of east exterior elevation of one of the 4 storey building blocks and interconnecting block.
Plan showing floor slab outline, full-height structural elements and photo locations
Photo 7: Building A7 detail of ceiling.
 Damage to exterior soffit where end wall of the building separated from the roof structure. No ceiling on building interior.  Detail of lights hung from roof structure indicating one light fitting that has become partially unclipped, assumed to be resulting from earthquake movements.
Photo 8: Building A13 interior ceiling damage.
 Localised damage to hung ceiling tiles adjacent to structural column penetrating ceiling.
Photo 9: Building A14 building internal ceiling, no damage observed
 No damage observed to ceilings or hung services.  No fire sprinklers observed.
Photo 10: Building A10 classroom corridor.
 No hung ceiling.  Acoustical protection applied directly to underside of concrete floor structure. No damage observed to hung services.
Photos 11 & 12: Gym close to Building A10.
 Suspended ceiling damaged at changes in orientation and adjacent to structural end walls and columns. No damage observed to hung services e.g. lights.  No fire sprinklers observed.  Note damage at change in ceiling orientation Photo 13: Building A11.
 No damaged observed to ceiling or hung non-structural elements. Ceiling appeared to be rigidly adhered to the concrete floor structure above.  No fire sprinklers observed.
Underground Services
Photos 14 & 15: Ground and underground services disruption Building A13.
Photo 16: Broken piping adjacent to Building A13.
 Significant ground rupture observed in the area of the dormitory resulting in significant damage to underground services particularly at junctions between pipes and cast in place concrete chambers and concrete foundation pads.
Building Cladding Systems
Photo 17: Building A14. Exterior covered in ceramic tiles applied directly to the concrete structure. A typical Japanese cladding system  No damage observed to building cladding system.
Photo 18: Building A12, Exterior tiled cladding.
 Cracking in cast in place concrete wall elements (considered to not be part of the lateral load resisting structure evidenced in the exterior tiles.
Photo 19: Apartment buildings Kumamoto. Undamaged buildings.
 Note separation joint in concrete balcony balustrades to allow movement without damage to building.
Stairs
Photo 20: Building A10 no damage observed to stairs.
 Stairs constructed in reinforced concrete, no sliding joints observed.
Photo 21: Building A11.
 No damage observed to stairs, minor cracking to nonstructural wall below stairs.  Stairs constructed in reinforced concrete, no sliding joints observed.
Furniture / Signage
Photo 22: Building A10.
 Bookcase laid down in school corridor to prevent possible falling in any aftershocks.
Photo 23: Building A13 exterior signage.
 Limited mortar joint affixing stone signage to wall.
Temporary Buildings
Photo 24: Building A11, Temporary school administration block.
Photo 25: Building A15, City Hall temporary office block erected on carpark adjacent to the damaged buildings they are temporarily replacing
Photo 38: Building A11,, Temporary class room block erected in school playing field
